Following a suicide attack in Kashmir in , Islamabad and New Delhi were on the brink of a nuclear confrontation. A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be devastating for both countries, but the indirect effects on climate would be catastrophic for the world.
Recovery would take more than ten years, while net primary productivity would decline percent on land and percent in oceans, threatening mass starvation and additional worldwide collateral fatalities. A successful US withdrawal from Afghanistan also requires peace in Kashmir. The combination of instability in Afghanistan and popular discontent— verging on an uprising —in Kashmir creates ripe conditions for spillover. They had to go somewhere. And for many of them, somewhere was Kashmir.
In any talks with Pakistani and Kashmiri representatives, India would be negotiating from a position of strength. It is a coalition of regional mainstream political parties aiming to restore the rights the people of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir held before August 5, On August 4, , as tens of thousands of new paramilitary troops deployed in the region, leaders of all of the major political parties in Kashmir, except the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party BJP , met and issued the so-called Gupkar Declaration.
For the latter, immediate steps may include securing land and jobs for the locals, youth outreach initiatives, releasing those still detained under charges of stone-pelting, and developing a surrender policy toward the militants. New Delhi would make progress with the political parties by softening its tone toward the mainstream Kashmiri politicians, releasing all political prisoners, disavowing patronage politics, and committing to a draft on future policy on Kashmir, which has been absent for several years.
In a world where reputation can be a source of power or a liability , India is currently at a disadvantage. Any workable solution therefore must address the full gamut of Kashmiri anger, even if no solution can fully assuage the intense negative sentiment about India. It is a feeling of impotence against an overbearing Indian state that propels successive generations to increasingly violent expression of their rage. In the short run, India can hope at best to neutralise the anger.
It cannot build emotional bridges, let alone win hearts. Subtly handled it can have a favourable impact upon the international issue as well. A flexible approach will allow various paths to a solution.
It must provide for the expelled Pandits living in forced exile. Amendments can always take care of constitutional impediments if they arise. We amend that document more than once annually on the average. It is possible to make the entire state autonomous as the Constitution envisages, or only parts of it, such as the Valley, and if the residents want, the adjoining Muslim majority areas.
Regional autonomy is possible for Ladakh and Jammu. Special relationships between Delhi and some parts of the state such as Leh can be envisaged in a deal, which gives Kashmir full autonomy over all matters outside those specified in Article Pandits who want to return should be enabled to do so, unconditionally. It is their legal right; Kashmiri Muslim clusters have come up in Jammu city without interference from its Hindus, the same principle applies to the Pandits.
Government sponsored colonies are a bad idea; but what is there to prevent housing cooperatives? Article allows trade and travel across the LoC. The restricted trade across the LoC needs to be expanded through a currency arrangement. If Kashmiris want their own currency, why stop them? Scotland after all has the Scottish pound freely useable in the UK. The permissive environment Pakistan has created for Jaish activities directed toward India can legitimately be seen as deliberate policy, regardless of whether specific attacks can be proved to be linked to Pakistani decision-making.
His father claimed he had joined Jaish after Indian troops beat and humiliated him. The July killing of Burhan Muzaffar Wani, a young charismatic Hizbul Mujahideen militant, accelerated these developments. Rampant rights abuses amid a climate of impunity, highlighted in the June UN report on Kashmir, and draconian laws such as the Armed Services Special Powers Act serve as recruiting tools for both Kashmiri separatist groups and Pakistani jihadist outfits like Jaish-e-Mohammed.
Although more than half of those killed were militants, many non-combatants were also killed, injured or disappeared in military operations, resulting in more support by local communities for the militant cause. Domestic outrage at the killing of more than 40 security personnel by the Kashmiri suicide bomber with admitted links to a Pakistan-based jihadist group has further vitiated already tense relations between Hindus and Muslims in India. Following the Pathankot and Uri attacks, India claimed to have launched surgical strikes on terrorist targets across the Line of Control dividing Indian and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
Though Pakistan denies that such strikes took place, there are almost weekly violations of the ceasefire line by Pakistani and Indian troops, claiming scores of lives of civilians and security personnel each year.
Concerned about heightened tensions, the U. If New Delhi were to opt for even a limited military strike across the Line of Control or the international border with Pakistan, that would increase the risk of conflict spiraling rapidly between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.
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